The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency recently made changes to its program for studying the toxic effects of industrial chemicals — the Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS). Under the revised process, the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is given unprecedented control over the content and conduct of these studies.

Today, OMB Watch released a factsheet "OMB Interferes in IRIS Assessments of Toxic Chemicals," which details the problems with the revised process. The factsheet answers the following questions:

• What is IRIS?
• How does OMB interfere in IRIS assessments?
• How does the new IRIS assessment process make matters worse?
• Why is the IRIS assessment process important?

Also today, the House Science Committee's subcommittee on Investigation and Oversight held a hearing on the changes to the IRIS process. Committee members and witnesses focused their discussion on the transparency, or lack thereof, in OMB's review of IRIS assessments and on the slow pace of completion of IRIS assessments. (EPA has completed only four assessments in the past two years.)

The committee heard from John Stephenson, the Director of Natural Resources and Environment for the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Stephenson's testimony was based on a recent GAO report critical of OMB's involvement in the IRIS assessment process.

Stephenson's primary complaint about the IRIS process is that any comments from OMB or other federal agencies will not be disclosed to the public. Stephenson also warned additional steps included in the revised process could further slow EPA's efforts to complete assessments.

Rep. Brad Miller (D-NC), chair of the panel, released a document that reveals the opinions of EPA staff scientists on OMB's role in the IRIS assessment process. In responding to GAO's report, staff involved in the IRIS program said OMB's comments are often "troubling to address" and the OMB review process "has added tremendously to the time it takes to release" draft and final assessments.

An investigation by the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee shows that the White House pressured the Environmental Protection Agency to refuse a request by the state of California to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.

In December, EPA denied a California petition, or waiver, that would have allowed the state to set standards for greenhouse gas emissions from vehicles. Under the Clean Air Act, only the federal government may regulate vehicle emissions; but California — and only California — may request permission to set up its own regulatory scheme. If EPA grants California permission (as it had with every request prior to this one), other states may choose between California's program and the federal program. At least 15 other states were prepared to follow California's plan, if permitted.

When EPA announced the denial, Administrator Stephen Johnson claimed the decision was his alone. But the denial of the California petition had the White House's fingerprints all over it. Last fall, Vice President Dick Cheney met with executives from Ford and Chrysler who urged him to deny the request, according to the investigation. The White House Council on Environmental Quality (along with the Transportation Department) lobbied U.S. representatives and governors urging them to oppose California's efforts.

At the time of the announcement, no hard evidence existed to refute Johnson's claim that he, and not the White House, was responsible for the denial. The deposition of an EPA assistant administrator, taken by the House investigators, begins to shed some light on who was actually responsible for the decision.

Committee investigators heard from EPA Associate Deputy Administrator Jason Burnett, whose carefully chosen words nonetheless cast doubts on Johnson's claim that the Dec. 19 decision to deny the waiver was his alone:

According to Mr. Burnett, Administrator Johnson's preference for a full or partial grant of the waiver did not change until after he communicated with the White House about the matter. When asked by Committee staff "whether the Administrator communicated with the White House in between his preference to do a partial grant and the ultimate decision" to deny the waiver, Mr. Burnett responded: "I believe the answer is yes." When asked "after his communications with the White House, did he still support granting the waiver in part," Mr. Burnett answered: "He ultimately decided to deny the waiver." Mr. Burnett also affirmed that there was "White House input into the rationale in the December 19th letter."

Unfortunately, we still don't know which White House offices or officials pressured EPA. Burnett repeatedly refused to answer the committee's questions on who communicated with EPA or what exactly was discussed. Burnett informed the committee he was under instruction from senior EPA officials to keep that information under wraps.

Check out the Committee's investigation and supporting documents here.

Friday, White House Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten sent a memo to the heads of federal agencies outlining the administration's policy on rules those agencies want to finalize by the end of the Bush administration. The memo states, "Except in extraordinary circumstances, regulations to be finalized in this Administration should be proposed no later than June 1, 2008, and final regulations should be issued no later than November 1, 2008."

So, agencies will have just three weeks to announce proposed rules they want to finalize by year's end.

More importantly, it means agencies will have to announce final rules by November 1. The November 1 deadline ensures the i's will be dotted and the t's will be crossed on all Bush regulations, before a new presidential administration takes over.

Most significant rules are published in the Federal Register shortly after the agency makes its final decision; but the Administrative Procedure Act requires agencies usually wait at least 30 days before making the rules effective. (Agencies sometimes choose to wait 45, 60, 90 days, or longer.)

So what will the next five-and-a-half months bring? Here's a sampling of rules the Bush administration may push to finalize in its waning days of power, in the event a new administration disagrees with its policy positions:

• A rule revoking the 25-year-old ban on carrying loaded weapons in national parks (proposed by the National Park Service in April 2008);
• Changes to the enforcement of the Family and Medical Leave Act that would make it more difficult for employees to claim leave time in certain situations (proposed by the Department of Labor in February 2008);
• A rule to exempt farms from reporting air pollution caused by animal waste (proposed by EPA in December 2007);
• A rule to ease air pollution control requirements on industrial facilities operating near national parks (proposed by EPA in June 2007).

Yesterday, the House Judiciary Committee's subcommittee on administrative law held a hearing to investigate how the Bush administration has used rulemaking practices to advance the Unitary Executive Theory .

President Bush and his minions use the Unitary Executive Theory to claim the president has complete control over the conduct of the executive branch, and that he is accountable to no one in exerting said control. Bush's penchant for issuing signing statements and his refusal to accept congressional input in his conduct of the war in Iraq are two examples of this theory.

Federal agency rulemakings also provide an opportunity for Bush to apply the Unitary Executive Theory. Time and time again, the Bush White House has foisted upon agencies decisions that ignore the plain language of federal statutes (for example, EPA's recent revision to the national air quality standard for ozone). After such decisions are made, the White House routinely invokes executive privilege in order to escape the oversight powers of Congress and extend itself beyond the grasp of public accountability.

What's really galling is that, instead of being frank about opposing public protections on their face, the Bush White House frequently attempts to alter the substantive considerations that inform regulatory decisions. In other words, officials inside White House offices, such as OMB, meddle with science in an attempt to legitimize their political opinions.

Rick Melberth, OMB Watch's director of regulatory policy, testified at the hearing, and summed up the problem:

The application of the unitary theory as it is practiced in this administration and framed in executive branch directives gives the president, and a cadre of employees that represent the president, control over the substantive decision making of agencies. As a result, politics is injected and elevated into decisions where science and rational judgment should prevail. Political appointees have greater control over the substance of regulations; politics supersedes scientific and technical information that is critical to protecting our environment and health and safety at home and in the workplace. ...

When the president has the ability to override this statutory delegation of authority, the balance of power between Congress and the Presidency is altered. There is the perception, if not the reality, that special interests are favored heavily over the needs of the public. This process does not lead to better rules and public protections. When the president makes a substantive regulatory decision based on political considerations, scientifically-based protective standards are vitiated.